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Abstract—Protecting location privacy in mobile services has
recently received significant consideration as Location-Based
Service (LBS) can reveal user locations to attackers. A problem
in the existing cloaking schemes is that location vulnerabilities
may be exposed when an attacker exploits a street map in
their attacks. While both real and synthetic trajectories are
based on real street maps, most of previous cloaking schemes
assume free space movements to define the distance between
users, resulting in the mismatch between privacy models and
user movements. In this paper, we present MeshCloak, a novel
map-based model for personalized location privacy, which is
formulated entirely in map-based setting and resists inference
attacks at a minimal performance overhead. The key idea of
MeshCloak is to quickly build a sparse constraint graph based
on the mutual coverage relationship between queries by pre-
computing the distance matrix and applying quadtree search.
MeshCloak also takes into account real speed profiles and query
frequencies. We evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the
proposed scheme via a suite of carefully designed experiments
on five real maps.
I. INTRODUCTION
Context awareness in mobile service has been widely
adopted in the last decade. A typical example of context-
aware mobile service is Location-Based Service (LBS) which
exploits geographical positions of mobile users to provide
convenient information and guidance (e.g., navigation guid-
ance, point-of-interest queries, traffic alerts, etc.) However,
such location-based services raise critical security and privacy
issues because attackers can extract a mobile user’s personal
information based on his/her locations and query contents.
To provide location privacy, existing approaches are either
user-centric (i.e. individual location obfuscation without the
anonymizer) or anonymizer-based in which an anonymizer
cloaks user locations into areas covering multiple users (e.g. at
least k users in k-anonymity [16]). Regarding the query update
frequency in LBS applications, existing algorithms can be
classified into two main groups: sporadic query (i.e., queries
are exposed infrequently and the attacker’s goal is to localize
users at certain time instants) and continuous query (i.e.,
queries are continuously issued by users and the adversary
can track users over time and space). This paper employs the
cloaking approach for continuous queries issued at different
frequencies.
Personalized location privacy [7] captures varying location
privacy requirements in which each mobile user specifies his
anonymity level (k value), spatial tolerance, and temporal
tolerance. In personalized location privacy, two users u and v
Fig. 1: (Top) free space vs. map-based settings. (Bottom)
movement constraints in map-based setting.
are potentially cloaked together if each of them is covered by
the spatio-temporal constraint box [7] of the other user. Such
a mutual coverage relationship forms an edge in the constraint
graph. Similarly, a group of k users are cloaked together if they
form a k-clique. This strong requirement is called reciprocity,
first coined in Hilbert Cloak [10] (see Section II).
In this paper, we present MeshCloak, a novel map-based
model for personalized location privacy. Compared to Clique-
Cloak [7], MeshCloak differs in two main points. First, while
users move on streets, CliqueCloak assumes spatial constraint
as a rectangle. This may become unrealistic and an attacker
can amount effective inference attacks by applying map-
based constraints. MeshCloak fixes this vulnerability by using
user speed constraints as spatial tolerance on the street map.
Second, CliqueCloak processes incoming queries one-by-one
and runs an inefficient search of maximal cliques in the
constraint graph. This limits the throughput of the anonymizer.
MeshCloak, on the contrary, collects and processes queries in
each time unit (e.g. in every second). Using quadtree structure
and the fast all-maximal clique listing by Tomita et al. [17],
it reduces the processing time by two orders of magnitude.
Fig. 1 contrasts the movement in free space and in map-
based settings. Unlike in free space setting, movements in
map-based setting are stipulated by real-world constraints on
route direction and speed. The users A and B in Fig. 1 are
close to each other in free space but this is no longer the
case from map-based perspective. Most of previous cloaking
schemes omit these shortest path intuitions in their model
by allowing user cloaking if the users are within a certain
Euclidean distance from each other.
2A. Contributions and Scope
The three main ideas distinguish MeshCloak from the
previous location privacy schemes. First, the real street map
is integrated for searching near-by mobile users to be cloaked
together, this idea eliminates the popular and unrealistic as-
sumption of free space movement. Second, a fast distance
computation between users is realized via a pre-computed
distance matrix and quadtree search. These techniques help
to maintain the sparse constraint graph in time nearly linear
to the number of users. Third, queries are processed in batches
(one batch per second) and maximal cliques in the current time
unit are listed quickly by running the Tomita algorithm [17].
Compared to prior work, our scheme highlights the follow-
ing features
• We formulate the problem of personalized location pri-
vacy entirely in map-based setting. To the best of our
knowledge, our research is the first to apply movement
distance constraint for cloaking purpose. We argue that
our problem formulation provides more realistic view on
spatial awareness.
• We propose a novel cloaking scheme MeshCloak for
this problem. MeshCloak incurs only a small processing
overhead thanks to the fast computation of the constraint
graph and maximal cliques within it. Our scheme can
process up to 30,000 queries per second, a throughput
much larger than the one reported in [7] and [15].
• We customize the Brinkhoff simulator [3] to support
varying query frequencies and realistic user speeds. The
performance evaluation on five real maps validates the
effectiveness and efficiency of our MeshCloak.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II briefly reviews related work and limitations. The motivation
for the current work is introduced in Section III. Section
III also defines the necessary concepts, mobility model and
assumptions in MeshCloak. Section IV presents MeshCloak
processing steps. Evaluation results are discussed in Section
V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
To motivate our MeshCloak scheme, this section reviews
previous LBS privacy models and some limitations.
A. Personalized Location Privacy
The intuition for LBS privacy of many existing work is
“protection from being brought to the attention of others”
by Gavison [6], which means safety by blending yourself
into a crowd. K-anonymity [16] and its extensions like l-
diversity [12], are therefore broadly investigated in previous
location privacy schemes [9], [10], [13], [18], [19]. Along
with k-anonymity model, to avoid outlier revealing attacks,
cloaking areas should satisfy reciprocity which is first coined
in Hilbert Cloak [10]. Reciprocity requires that a set of k
users must have
k(k−1)
2 relationships, also called k-clique in
graph terms. Reciprocal framework [8] generalized the idea
of reciprocity to be adaptable to any existing spatial index on
the user locations. Reciprocity appeared earlier under different
names of clique in CliqueCloak [7] and k-sharing region in
[5]. For moving objects databases, [1] defines the Anonymity
Set of Trajectories based on the mutual Co-localization which
also implies reciprocity.
Personalized location k-anonymity brings versatility to
users, allowing them to dynamically increase (decrease) pri-
vacy requirements when entering (leaving) easily identifiable
areas. This concept was first proposed by Gedik and Liu [7],
employing both spatial cloaking (constraint boxes) and tem-
poral cloaking (message delaying). The personalized scheme
became the de-facto and was extended in many ways in LBS
privacy protection [5], [15] and relational database research
[20].
B. Free Space Model
Location anonymization in free space appears in a large
number of existing papers [9], [7], [10], [8], [11], [15], [2],
[19]. The assumption of free movement in all directions
considerably simplifies the spatial privacy model, paving the
way for the application of popular tree structures (quad-tree, R-
tree) and partitioning techniques (grid-like partitioning, Hilbert
filling curves). Neighborhood relationship in this setting is
also reduced to simple geometrical operations, e.g. point-in-
rectangle checking. This simplification certainly ignores many
real-world movement constraints like high-ways, viaducts,
tunnels, one-way routes, impasses and so on (Fig. 1).
Moving in constrained space attracts a bit less attention
[18], [21], [14]. XSTAR [18] and PLPCA [21] support sporadic
query and use k-anonymity along with l-diversity [12] of street
segments. MobiMix [14] exploits the “mix zone” concept to
cope with timing tracking attack and may have the problem
of space-time intersection rarity.
C. Moving-Together Implication
In continuous query model, typical attacks like location-
dependent attacks [4], [15] and query tracking attacks [5] im-
ply “moving-together” requirement. The two solutions patch-
ing and delaying in [4] induce large cloaking areas over time to
keep non-decreasing uncertainty of cloaked location. IClique-
Cloak [15] suffers from a similar issue in which cloaking areas
may grow up to 80% of the map area. The memorization
property proposed in [5] is strict enough to prevent query
tracking attacks. Cloaking areas reported in [5] are up to
11% of the map area thanks to the flexible group join/leave
operations. However, both [5] and [15] are formulated in free
space setting.
III. MESHCLOAK PRIVACY MODEL
A. Motivation
In this section, we explain some limitations of free space
assumption in existing schemes. Fig. 2 illustrates such prob-
lematic cases in CliqueCloak [7]. At time t+∆t, users A and
B move to new locations A′ and B′. Using constraint boxes as
in CliqueCloak, A′ and B′ are still considered “close” and they
form an edge in the constraint graph. However, an attacker by
using the map can reveal that the shortest path between A′
3Fig. 2: Free space vulnerability in CliqueCloak [7]
Fig. 3: Free space vulnerability in ICliqueCloak [15]
and B′ increases considerably at t + ∆t and may remove B
from cloaking set of A and vice-versa. In the left figure, A′
and B′ move far away the bridge so the shortest path between
them gets longer. In the right figure, the one-way suggests that
A′ is near B′ but not vice-versa. We observe that closeness in
terms of shortest path implies closeness in free space but the
converse is not true.
A potential vulnerability of ICliqueCloak [7] based on Mini-
mum Boundary Rectangle (MBR) in free space is illustrated in
the Fig. 3. At time t, user A’s cloaking region is MBR(A,B,C).
By Maximum Movement Boundary (MMB) constraint, at
time t + ∆t , A’s new location A′ is cloaked with say D
and E. MBR(A′,D,E) (the dotted rectangle) is clearly cov-
ered by MMB(A,B,C), the rounded rectangle extended from
MBR(A,B,C) with a radius of vAmax×∆t. The vulnerability
is revealed if the attacker uses the street map (bold solid lines)
and assumes the intersected points A,B,C and F as user A’s
possible locations at t. The extended convex hull of A,B,C and
F by vAmax ×∆t makes A
′ isolated from MBR(A′,D,E). So
just as in CliqueCloak, free space assumption allows attackers
to amount effective map-based attacks on ICliqueCloak.
As a consequence, employing shortest distances as spatial
tolerance makes the cloaking more realistic. A′ and B′ should
be called “closed” at t+∆t if and only if the shortest distances
from A′ to B′ and from B′ to A′ are within a certain threshold.
Such a threshold is the distance each user can move in ∆t.
We clarify this idea in the following sections.
B. Anonymization Architecture
We adopt the conventional centralized trusted third party
architecture which composes of mobile users, a trusted
anonymizer, and an untrusted LBS service provider (see Fig.
4). We assume the connection between the users and the
anonymizer is secure and that between the anonymizer and
the LBS server may be insecure. The users send periodic
queries (continuous queries) to the LBS server to get location-
based information. The cloaking engine of the anonymizer
Fig. 4: System architecture
Fig. 5: Reachable street segments (bounded by filled triangles)
from user location (filled circle) within a distance constraint.
in the middle effectively hides the users’ exact locations
using cloaking schemes. Upon receiving query results from
the LBS server, the anonymizer refines and delivers only the
information corresponding to the users’ exact locations. Using
a centralized anonymizer makes the cloaking easier as there is
only one entity the users must trust, not so complicated as in
peer-to-peer models. Centralized anonymizer aggregates user
current locations into a global view, making the collaboration
among users implicit. Also, the anonymizer mitigates the
processing burden at user side.
C. Spatial Tolerance via Distance Constraint
Instead of asking users to specify the spatial tolerance in
each query (dx, dy for both coordinates) as in CliqueCloak,
we use the maximum distance that each user can move in
∆t. This kind of constraint covers a lot of real movement
conditions like route direction, maximum vehicle speed, route
capacity and so on. Brinkhoff’s simulator [3] and other similar
tools already integrate such movement conditions.
From the attacker’s perspective, if we know (approximately)
the current location, the maximum speed of a certain user and
the interval ∆t between his two consecutive queries, we can
estimate the distance constraint dc and compute the boundary
of his movement as in Fig. 5.
D. Constraint Graph and Cloaking Mesh
1) Constraint Graph: To cloak users, our scheme first
models user locations and their closeness relationship as an
undirected and unweighted graph called constraint graph (CG)
[7]. The users become the nodes of CG, and an edge is created
between a pair of nodes A and B if and only if the shortest
distances from A to B and from B to A are smaller than both
dcA and dcB . In Fig. 6, the locations of A,B and D are close
in terms of shortest distance (i.e. A is within the boundary
of D’s movement and so on), so the three users are cloaked
together. On the other hand, user C cannot reach A,B or D
4Fig. 6: Constraint Graph and Cloaking Mesh
within his distance constraint and forms no edges between it
and the other users. Note that CG is a dynamic graph as user
queries come and go. We show how to efficiently build the
CG in Section IV.
2) Cloaking Mesh: After deciding a group of users to
be cloaked together (called cloaking set), the anonymizer
computes the cloaking mesh, a union of streets reachable
from users within their distance constraints). For example,
the cloaking set of users A,B and D has the cloaking mesh
as shown on the right of Fig. 6. Note that we return streets,
not street segments, in cloaking meshes (see also Algorithm
3). This change has two advantages: faster to compute and
more resistant to boundary attack. Boundary attack means the
attacker tries to infer user locations using boundary points of
the cloaking meshes and users’ distance constraints. This kind
of attack was also mentioned in ICliqueCloak’s vulnerability
(Fig. 3).
E. User Privacy
Following the concept of personalized location privacy [7],
each submitted query in MeshCloak has the following format
q(A) = {k, t, x, y, dt, dcA}
where k is the desired minimum k-anonymity level (i.e. the
cloaking set containing A should be of size at least k). t is
the timestamp of query and (x, y) is the coordinates of user at
t. Temporal tolerance is specified in dt, which means that the
query should be processed in the interval [t, t+ dt], otherwise
it expires and would be removed from the constraint graph. As
discussed above, we set the spatial tolerance by the distance
constraint dcA which is the product of query interval and user
speed. For example, if user A issues a query every 10 second
and its speed is at most 10m/s, then dcA = 10s × 10m/s =
100m.
F. Attacker Knowledge
We assume that the attacker wants to reidentify the location
of some user A at time t + ∆t providing that he knows
(approximately) A’s location at time t and A’s maximum speed.
By looking at the street map, the attacker can use A’s distance
constraint dcA to estimate A’s movement boundary as depicted
in Fig. 5. Because dcA = vAmax ×∆t, the larger ∆t is, the
safer A’s location at time t+∆t gets.
To mitigate this kind of location attack, we propose to use
distance constraints as spatial tolerance (Section III-C). If a
TABLE I: Comparison of MeshCloak (MC) vs. CliqueCloak
(CC) and ICliqueCloak (ICC)
Setting Maximal cliques Distance constraint
MC Map-based Batch by Tomita v ×∆t
CC [7] Free-space Local-search Provided by users
ICC [15] Free-space Edge-based incremental v ×∆t
Fig. 7: Shortest distance computation by landmarks.
collection of users U = {Ai}, in which every user is within
the distance constraints of the other users (i.e. they form a
clique in the CG), then Ai’s location can be “swapped” to
any other user in U at time t+∆t.
As far as we know, the idea of using speed as a move-
ment constraint first appeared in ICliqueCloak [15]. How-
ever, ICliqueCloak considers free space. It prevents location-
dependent attacks by hiding user Movement Boundary Rect-
angles (MBR) in two consecutive time steps. This strong
assumption leads to very large cloaking areas (up to 80% of
the whole map area). Also, ICliqueCloak keeps incremental
maximal cliques by processing each new edge in the CG
which further increases the processing time. Table I compares
our MeshCloak with CliqueCloak and ICliqueCloak in several
aspects.
IV. MESHCLOAK ALGORITHM
A. Precomputation of Map Distance Matrix
To be able to process a large number of queries per second,
the crucial point in MeshCloak is a fast construction of
the constraint graph and a fast search of maximal cliques.
In our model, distance constraints determine the coverage
relationship between users. As a result, given user A’s location
and its distance constraint dcA, our goal is to quickly search
for other user locations reachable from A within dcA. We show
below how to do this with the help of the street map.
Fig. 7 shows possible cases of shortest distance computation
by using street terminals as landmarks. To find the shortest
distance d(A,B) which may be different from d(B,A), we
utilize the fact that A and B are on certain streets. Let d(u, v)
be the shortest distance between two street terminals u and v,
d(A,B) is computed as follows
Case 1: A and B are on two-way streets: d(A,B) =
min{d(A, u)+d(u,w)+d(w,B), d(A, u)+d(u, t)+d(t, B),
d(A, v) + d(v, w) + d(w,B), d(A, v) + d(v, t) + d(t, B)}
Case 2: A (resp. B) is on a one-way (resp. two-way)
street: d(A,B) = min{d(A, v)+d(v, w)+d(w,B), d(A, v)+
d(v, t) + d(t, B)}
Case 3: A (resp. B) is on a two-way (resp. one-way)
street: d(A,B) = min{d(A, u)+d(u,w)+d(w,B), d(A, v)+
d(v, w) + d(w,B)}
5Fig. 8: Sub-map centered at u constrained by dcmax. Filled
squares are terminals included in the sub-map.
Case 4: A and B are on one-way streets: d(A,B) =
d(A, v) + d(v, w) + d(w,B)
The other cases for two users on the same street (e.g. A and
C), the computation is similar or even simpler.
From the above observations, if shortest distances between
street terminals are given prior, d(A,B) can be determined
in O(1). That is why we precompute the shortest distances
between street terminals (e.g. between u and w, u and t and so
on). The Dijkstra algorithm is our choice. Let V be the set of
street terminals, E be the set of streets, the shortest distances
from one terminal to al the other cost O(|E| log |V |). The full
computation of distance matrixM will cost O(|V ||E| log |V |).
Note that V and E are map-specific information, not related
to the number of users querying location services.
In practice, we do not need the full computation of distance
matrix M because of user distance constraints. Let dcmax be
the maximum distance constraint, say 1000m or 2000m, we
need only a distance matrixM(dcmax) in which we retain only
shortest distances upper bounded by dcmax. Fig. 8 illustrates
this idea. The terminal u and the distance dcmax induce
the sub-map G(u, dcmax) composing of terminals inside the
square centered at u having edge length of 2.dcmax. We
extract sub-maps using squares instead of circles to exploit
the quadtree data structure. Now the Dijkstra algorithm runs
on the sub-maps only, reducing the computation of M(dcmax)
to nearly O(|V | log |V |) in which the factor log |V | is due to
the quadtree search.
All these steps are presented in Algorithm 1. We build a
quadtree from the coordinates of all street terminals V (Line
2). Then for each terminal u, a range search centered at u with
edge length 2.dcmax will return a set of nearby terminals Su
(Lines 3-4). A subgraph and shortest distances from u to other
terminals in Su are implemented in Lines 5-6. Finally, we keep
only tuple (u, v, d(u, v)) if d(u, v) ≤ dcmax (Lines 7-9).
B. Building Constraint Graph
Given the distance matrix M(dcmax) and a list of queries
QW waiting for processing, we can build the constraint graph
in nearly O(|QW | log |QW |) (see Algorithm 2). Again, we
apply the idea of filtering out far-away queries by using the
quadtree structure. In Fig. 9, a range search centered at A with
edge length 2.dcA may return eight potential queries (denoted
as filled or dashed circles). Combining with M(dcmax), we
Algorithm 1 MapDistanceMatrix
Input: street map G = (V,E), maximum distance constraint
dcmax.
Output: M(dcmax)
1: M(dcmax)← ∅
2: build the quadtree Qt← QuadTree(V )
3: for u ∈ V do
4: Su ← RangeSearch(Qt, u, dcmax)
5: sGu ← subgraph(G,Su ∪ {u})
6: {(u, v, d(u, v))} ← Dijkstra(sGu)
7: for v ∈ Su do
8: if d(u, v) ≤ dcmax then
9: M(dcmax)←M(dcmax) ∪ (u, v, d(u, v))
Fig. 9: Filled circles: all potential near-by queries of A
constrained by dcA. Dashed circles: queries truly reachable
from A within dcA.
further eliminate queries not truly reachable from A within
dcA (the filled circles), retaining only three queries (denoted
as dashed circles). Line 6 runs in O(1) thanks to case-by-case
checking described in Section IV-A. Note that, we keep only
undirected edges in CG(QW ) (Line 9).
Algorithm 2 ConstraintGraph
Input: street map G = (V,E), distance matrix M(dcmax),
list of queries QW
Output: constraint graph CG(QW )
1: CG(QW )← ∅
2: build the quadtree Qt← QuadTree(QW )
3: for q ∈ QW do
4: Sq ← RangeSearch(Qt, q, dcq)
5: for q′ ∈ Sq do
6: d(q, q′)← shortest distance(q, q′,M(dcmax))
7: if d(q, q′) ≤ dcq then
8: CG(QW )← CG(QW ) ∪ (q, q
′)
9: keep only edge (q, q′) iff (q′, q) exists in CG(QW )
C. Cloaking Mesh
Given a clique U of users in the CG, the cloaking mesh (Fig.
6) of U can be computed as the union of streets reachable from
any user A in U within dcA (see Fig. 5).
CMesh(U) =
⋃
A∈U EMesh(A)
6For each successfully cloaked user A, we compute its
Expanding Mesh EMesh(A) as in Algorithm 3. First, we
identify the map street e that A belongs to (Line 1). We
initialize the empty EMesh(A), an array visited and a queue q
in Lines 2-3. Depending on e’s direction, one or two items
are enqueued into q (Lines 4-8). Each item is a tuple of
(u, v, L) which means we examine the directed edge from u to
v and the remaining length is L. Finally, EMesh(A) is updated
incrementally by breadth-first-search on G(V,E) (Lines 9-15)
as long as the remaining length L is not negative.
Algorithm 3 ExpandingMesh
Input: street map G = (V,E), user A’s location (x, y),
distance constraint dcA
Output: expanding mesh EMesh(A)
1: e(u, v): the street that (x, y) belongs to
2: EMesh(A)← {e}, visited(u) = False ∀u ∈ V
3: queue q ← ∅
4: if e is one-way then
5: q.enqueue((u, v, L = dcA)), visited(v) = True
6: else // two-way street
7: q.enqueue((u, v, L = dcA)), visited(v) = True
8: q.enqueue((v, u, L = dcA)), visited(u) = True,
9: while q not empty do
10: e(u, v, L)← q.dequeue()
11: if e.L > 0 then
12: for w ∈ N(v) AND visited(w) == False do
13: EMesh(A)← EMesh(A) ∪ (v, w)
14: q.enqueue((v, w, L = e.L− d(v, w)))
15: visited(w) = True
16: return EMesh(A)
D. Cloaking Algorithm
As in CliqueCloak, incoming queries are stored in a queue.
Each query has one of four possible states: state NEW if the
query is a newly arrived, state EXPIRED if the query cannot
be cloaked in its interval [t, t+dt], state WAITING if query is
waiting for cloaking and does not expire, state SUCCEEDED
if query is successfully cloaked with some other queries. We
denote QN ,QE ,QW and QS as the sets of NEW, EXPIRED,
WAITING and SUCCEEDED queries respectively.
Unlike per-query sequential processing in CliqueCloak, our
MeshCloak processes incoming queries in small batches, one
batch per second (see Algorithm 4). In each batch, MeshCloak
involves four steps: removing expired queries (Lines 3-7),
collecting new queries and building the constraint graph (Lines
8-10), listing all maximal cliques (Line 11) and processing
successfully cloaked queries (Lines 12-17). Temporal toler-
ance checking is carried out in Line 5. K-anonymity level of
the query q is checked in Line 14.
Note that each batch of queries must be processed fast
enough to prevent as much as possible query expiration. That
is the reason for using Tomita algorithm [17], one of the fastest
all-maximal-cliques listing methods. Processing queries one-
by-one as in CliqueCloak [7] and ICliqueCloak [15] incurs
much higher time for maintaining maximal cliques.
Algorithm 4 MeshCloak
Input: street map G = (V,E), maximum distance constraint
dcmax, a stream of queries Q.
Output: cloaking results for queries
1: M(dcmax)←MapDistanceMatrix(G).
2: while cloaking engine is running do
3: // remove expired queries from QW , add them to QE
4: for query q ∈ QW do
5: if q.t+ q.dt < now then
6: QE ← QE ∪ {q}
7: QW ← QW − {q}
8: collect queries in the last second from Q into QN
9: QW ← QW ∪QN
10: CG(QW )← ConstraintGraph(QW ,M(dcmax))
11: CL← all maximal cliques in CG(QW ) by [17]
12: for query q ∈ QW do
13: CL(q)← argmaxc{|c| |c ∈ CL, c ∋ q}
14: if |CL(q)| ≥ q.k then
15: output CloakingMesh(CL(q))
16: QS ← QS ∪ {q}
17: QW ← QW − {q}
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness
of our scheme MeshCloak. The efficiency is measured in
cloaking time per request while the effectiveness is evaluated
in terms of success rate, average mesh length, relative k-
anonymity and relative temporal tolerance. Experimental set-
ting is first described in Section V-A, followed by experimental
results in V-B. All cloaking algorithms are implemented in
C++ and run on a desktop PC with Intelr Core i7-6700@
3.4Ghz, 16GB memory.
A. Experimental Setting
Real road maps from many cities 1 can be extracted before
being input to Brinkhoff’s simulator [3]. We test five real
maps: Oldenburg (Germany), Hanoi (Vietnam), Paris-zone1
(France), Singapore and San Joaquin (USA). The character-
istics of five datasets are summarized in Table II.
We customized Brinkhoff’s simulator to incorporate real
user speed and query interval (Table III). We simulate 100,000
users moving according to two speed profiles P1 and P2. Each
user issues 11 queries with personalized k-anonymity. We test
two settings of k-anonymity: k ∈ [2 − 5] and k ∈ [2 − 10].
The first query time of each user is assigned with a random
integral value in the range [0 - 50].
In Table III, speed proportion indicates the proportions
of users moving with given speeds. For example, in P1
there are 25% of users moving with speed 10m/s. Similarly,
query interval and query interval proportion let us know the
proportions of users issuing queries after a given time interval.
For example, in P1 there are 50% of users issuing one query
every 5 seconds. As stated in Section III-E, user speed and
query interval define the distance constraint. Finally, temporal
1https://www.openstreetmap.org/
7TABLE II: Map properties
Oldenburg Hanoi Paris-zone1 Singapore San Joaquin
Nodes 6,105 27,213 42,494 54,674 52,528
Edges 7,029 31,562 63,722 74,053 57,284
Width(km) 23.57 11.97 18.87 33.65 22.97
Height(km) 26.92 12.48 10.20 16.14 20.19
Area(km2) 634.44 149.40 192.47 543.11 463.76
Total street length(km) 1,301.70 1,531.64 4,344.18 5,856.25 2,853.83
TABLE III: Experiment settings
Parameter Values
No. users 100,000
No. queries/user 11
First query time [0-50s]
k-anonymity [2-5], [2-10]
Speed profile 1 (P1)
Speed (m/s) [10, 20, 30, 50]
Speed proportion [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25]
Query interval [5s, 10s, 20s]
Query interval proportion [0.5, 0.3, 0.2]
Temporal tolerance [3s, 4s, 5s]
Speed profile 2 (P2)
Speed (m/s) [10, 20, 30, 50]
Speed proportion [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25]
Query interval [20s, 30s]
Query interval proportion [0.5, 0.5]
Temporal tolerance [3s, 5s, 7s, 10s]
tolerance should not exceed the minimum query interval. For
each profile, we test different temporal tolerance values.
The actual clique size that a user belongs to may be larger
than the user’s k-anonymity. Similarly, users may be cloaked
sooner than the time constrained by the temporal tolerance.
As a result, we define relative k-anonymity (rel.k) as the ratio
of the actual clique size to user’s desired k-anonymity and
relative temporal tolerance (rel.dt) as the ratio of the actual
cloaking delay to user’s temporal tolerance dt.
B. Experimental Results
1) Query Volume: We visualize the query volume at dif-
ferent time steps in Fig. 10. The query volume comprises the
numbers of NEW, SUCCEEDED, EXPIRED and WAITING
queries. Fig. 10a shows the volume of NEW queries on
Oldenburg and Hanoi maps with profiles P1 and P2. Clearly,
P2 provides flatter volume progression. This is explained by
P2’s query interval which includes only two values 20s and
30s. The similar tendencies are observed in the volume of
SUCCEEDED and EXPIRED queries. These curves imply
fairly stable success rates which are defined as the ratio of
the number of SUCCEEDED queries to the total number of
SUCCEEDED and WAITING queries. In Fig. 10d, we show
how the number of nodes and edges of the Constraint Graph
change as time passes. The number of nodes (edges) in the
CG may rise up to 25,000 (130,000) but the Tomita algorithm
still needs a fraction of time to list all the maximal cliques.
2) Effectiveness and efficiency: The effectiveness and effi-
ciency of our MeshCloak are reported in Figures 11-15. Each
metric is evaluated in four combinations of speed profile and
k-anonymity at different values of temporal tolerance. For
the same speed profile (P1 or P2), we can see that higher
k-anonymity levels or smaller temporal tolerances reduce
the success rate (Fig. 11). This is because smaller temporal
tolerances make the WAITING set smaller, so the CG gets
smaller and sparser while higher k-anonymity levels cannot
be satisfied easily by the size of maximal cliques in the CG.
Meanwhile, P2 always gives better success rate than P1 for
the same k-anonymity. This is supported by the fact that in
P2, the distance constraints are larger, so the CG gets denser,
producing larger maximal cliques for cloaking purpose.
The processing time in Fig. 12 highlights the runtime advan-
tage of MeshCloak. Each query is processed in about tenth of
millisecond. Our techniques described in Section IV are crucial
in lowering the time for building the CG. Besides, Tomita al-
gorithm [17] fits well in MeshCloak’s batch processing model
(one batch per second). As a result, MeshCloak’s throughput
is much higher than the throughput reported in CliqueCloak
and ICliqueCloak in which the average processing time per
query is from several to tens of milliseconds.
From the LBS providers’ perspective, small to moderate
cloaking areas are preferred because large cloaking areas have
high impact on the quality of service. Large cloaking areas
require longer time to process at LBS servers and heavier data
transfer back and forth between the anonymizer and the LBS
providers. In our MeshCloak, we use cloaking meshes instead
of cloaking areas due to the inherent map-based setting that we
advocate. Fig. 13 displays the average mesh length per query
which is about one thousandth of the total street length (cf.
Table II). Moreover, the average mesh length is quite stable
across different speed profiles and k-anonymity levels. Paris-
zone1 and Singapore have longer total street length, so are the
average mesh length reported in these two maps compared to
the three remaining maps.
Finally, relative k-anonymity and relative temporal tolerance
are shown in Figures 14 and 15. We can observe that the
relative k-anonymity is fairly independent of the temporal
tolerance. It is always larger than one and rises up for
speed profile P2 (cf. 14 c-d). Again, this phenomenon is
justified by the denser CG when users move according to P2
profile. Differently, the relative temporal tolerance decreases
considerably for larger temporal tolerances. By multiplying
the rel.dt with the temporal tolerance, we can see that most of
the queries are successfully cloaked within two seconds since
the time they reach the anonymizer. This fact again guarantees
the better service quality because the users would experience
only a short waiting time for the LBS results.
3) Batch vs. Sequential Processing: In this section, we
compare batch versus sequential processing in MeshCloak.
Sequential processing means that for each newly coming
query, the anonymizer checks the query’s distance constraints
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Fig. 10: Query volume (P1-3-5 denotes the configuration of P1 speed profile, dt = 3, k = 5) and so on
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Fig. 11: Success rate
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Fig. 12: Processing time per query (the same legends as in Fig. 11)
and updates the CG. The list of maximal cliques in the CG is
incrementally maintained as in ICliqueCloak [15]. However,
we apply node-based incremental which is several times faster
than the edge-based incremental in ICliqueCloak. Table IV
compares the processing time per query between the two
processing models. Clearly, sequential processing is two orders
of magnitude slower than batch processing. This is mainly due
to the costly set operations in maintaining maximal cliques by
the sequential models. Moreover, taking much more time to
process incoming queries in the sequential models impacts
heavily the success rate because a large portion of queries
will expire. This result again explains our choice of batch
model (one batch per second) running the blazingly fast Tomita
algorithm [17] on the sparse constraint graphs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The existing free-space cloaking schemes based on map-
based moving patterns suffer from the mismatch between
cloaking models and user movements. They omit most of
real-world movement constraints. Our paper addresses this
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Fig. 13: Average mesh length (the same legends as in Fig. 11)
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Fig. 14: Relative k-anonymity (the same legends as in Fig. 11)
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Fig. 15: Relative temporal tolerance (the same legends as in Fig. 11)
TABLE IV: Processing time (ms/query): Batch vs. Sequential
processing
Batch with
Tomita
Node-based
Sequential
Seq/Batch
Oldenburg-P1 (dt=3,k=5) 0.0137 8.09 590x
Oldenburg-P1 (dt=5,k=5) 0.0184 12.70 690x
Hanoi-P1 (dt=3,k=5) 0.0338 10.06 298x
Hanoi-P1 (dt=5,k=5) 0.0410 13.32 325x
shortcoming by stating the problem entirely in the map-based
setting and proposes novel scheme to solve it. Our key tech-
niques is a fast distance computation between map nodes (via a
pre-computed distance matrix along with quadtree search) and
an efficient batch processing model. Experiments in various
configurations confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of our
MeshCloak in terms of success rate, processing time, average
mesh length and relative k-anonymity/temporal tolerance. We
believe that the map-based setting deserves more attention in
future research on location privacy.
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